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Key facts
£417m
amount paid out by the 
Student Loans Company 
to full-time students at 
alternative providers 
in 2015/16
34,000
number of students at 
alternative providers 
claiming full-time student 
support in 2015/16
112
number of alternative 
higher education 
providers designated 
for student funding as 
at September 2017
£36 million total unrecovered ineligible payments in the six years to 2015/16
£10 million ineligible payments made in 2014/15 and 2015/16
25% average non-continuation rate for alternative providers in 2014/15 
compared with 38% in 2012/13 (on the basis of indicative data)
11 number of alternative providers with higher than expected 
non-continuation rates when characteristics of their student 
population are taken into account (2014/15)
10 number of alternative providers with lower than expected 
non-continuation rates when characteristics of their student 
population are taken into account (2014/15)
The convention used throughout this report is that academic years are written as 
2012/13 and fi nancial years are written as 2012-13.
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Summary
1 In December 2014, we published our Investigation into financial support for students 
at alternative higher education providers.1 The report examined the arrangements for 
oversight and funding of alternative higher education providers. These are institutions that 
offer higher education qualifications but that do not receive direct funding from the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). They do have students who access 
public funds through student support. At September 2017, there were 112 alternative 
providers accessing student support funding. 
2 Our 2014 report focused on four specific concerns:
• students at some alternative providers had claimed support for which they 
were not eligible;
• some providers had recruited students who did not have the capability 
or motivation to complete their courses;
• some providers had recruited students in receipt of student support onto 
courses that the former Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) 
had not approved; and
• some providers had given the former BIS inaccurate information about 
student attendance.
3 The Committee of Public Accounts held evidence sessions in December 2014 
and March 2015. In February 2015, it published a report which made recommendations 
for strengthening oversight of the alternative provider sector.
4 In July 2016, the Department for Education (the Department) assumed 
responsibility for higher education, including the alternative provider sector. 
Previously, BIS (now the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy) 
had responsibility. In this report, we refer to the department with responsibility 
for higher education as ‘the Department’.
1 Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Investigation into financial support for 
students at alternative higher education providers, Session 2014-15, HC 861, National Audit Office, December 2014.
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Scope and approach
5 This follow-up report focuses on the issues we and the Committee of Public 
Accounts reported on in 2014 and 2015. Specifically, we examine the following:
• whether there are signs that the Department has resolved the major issues 
we identified in 2014 (Part Two);
• whether the evolving oversight arrangements offer protection to taxpayers 
and students (Part Three); and
• whether the Department has assessed the effectiveness of the policy of 
expanding the alternative provider sector (Part Four).
6 This report does not examine the full range of processes that the Department 
and its partner organisations use to oversee alternative providers or the financial 
sustainability of alternative providers. It focuses on students from England and the 
European Union who attend alternative providers and receive student support from 
the Student Loans Company (SLC).
Key findings
Size of the sector 
7 The number of students at alternative providers receiving student loans has 
declined from a peak of 51,000 in 2013/14 to 34,000 in 2015/16. In November 2013, 
following rapid expansion in the number of students accessing support since 2010/11, 
the Department instructed 23 of the fastest-growing alternative providers to stop 
recruiting funded students. In 2014/15, the Department imposed additional student 
number controls. The total support paid to students has declined, from £724 million 
in 2013/14 to £417 million in 2015/16. The Department told us that it does not have 
a target size for the alternative provider sector as its aim is to manage a demand-led 
sector, by routinely using student number controls both to enable controlled growth in 
quality degree-level providers and as a sanction to limit the size of poorly performing 
providers (paragraph 2.9).
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Ineligible payments 
8 The level of ineligible payments has fallen as a proportion of all payments 
made to students attending alternative providers, from 4% in 2012/13 to 0.5% 
in 2015/16. The number of ineligible students receiving student support follows a 
similar trend. The Department attributes this reduction to new controls it implemented 
in response to the issues we raised in 2014 and analysing applications data on a daily 
basis to detect new problems emerging (paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3).
9 However, the Department does not on a regular basis measure and analyse 
the scale of or reasons behind why ineligible payments are made to students 
attending alternative providers, because of limitations in how the SLC records 
ineligible payments data. The Department considers that its annual audit to measure 
the overall rate of fraudulent or incorrect payments across the higher education sector 
is a proportionate and risk-based approach, given the drop in ineligible payments 
to students at alternative providers since our 2014 report. Nevertheless, improved 
management information and analysable data would help the Department measure the 
level of ineligible payments in a timely manner, explore what may be behind trends and 
further tighten controls where needed (paragraphs 2.4 to 2.7).
10 Furthermore, the Department has not recovered £36 million of the £45 million 
ineligible payments it identified in the six years to 2015/16. This total includes 
around £10 million of ineligible payments made in 2014/15 and 2015/16 (paragraph 2.6).
Non-continuation rates 
11 The proportion of students who drop out of their studies (indicative 
non‑continuation rate) has reduced over time.2 Between 2012/13 (the most recent 
data available when we reported in 2014) and 2014/15 (the most recent data currently 
available), the overall indicative non-continuation rate for the alternative provider sector 
reduced from 38% to 25% (paragraphs 2.10 to 2.12).
12 However, the indicative non‑continuation rate at alternative providers is 
three percentage points higher than the sector benchmark, and 15 percentage 
points higher than for the rest of the higher education sector. The benchmark 
non-continuation rates take into account the characteristics of each individual provider’s 
student population such as age and subjects studied. For the alternative provider 
sector as a whole, the non-continuation rate in 2014/15 was 25% compared with a 
sector benchmark of 22%. The non-continuation rate for HEFCE-funded providers 
is 10%. These providers have fewer students with characteristics associated with 
high non-continuation (paragraphs 2.12 and 2.13).
2 The Department calculated indicative non-continuation rates using similar methodology to that used by the 
Higher Education Statistics Agency when publishing non-continuation rates for HEFCE-funded providers.
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13 The three largest providers have non‑continuation rates above their 
benchmarks. The Department has used the benchmark non-continuation rates published 
by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) to identify under-performing providers. 
For students beginning their studies in 2014/15, 11 providers had non-continuation rates 
that were between five and 55 percentage points higher than their individual benchmarks. 
Ten providers had non-continuation rates that were between four and 17 percentage 
points lower than their individual benchmarks. The remaining providers either had 
non-continuation rates that were not significantly different from their benchmarks, or had 
too few students for meaningful measurement of non-continuation rates (paragraph 2.15).
14 The Department has taken action against all 11 providers with high 
non‑continuation rates in 2014/15. To make consistent decisions on sanctions 
where providers had high non-continuation rates in 2014/15, the Department used a 
framework comparing providers’ non-continuation rates with individual benchmarks 
based on each provider’s student population. The framework also considered the 
absolute non-continuation performance of each provider. Of the 11 providers with 
high non-continuation rates relative to benchmarks, three are no longer designated 
for student support and the Department has issued improvement notices to the 
remaining eight. It issued an improvement notice to one further provider where 
its non-continuation rate was considered unacceptably high in absolute terms 
(paragraphs 2.18 and 2.19 and Figure 6).
15 More timely and reliable non‑continuation data would enable the Department 
to impose sanctions more promptly. The Department uses end-of-year data on 
non-continuation rates as the basis for sanctions on under-performing providers. 
However, depending on when a student stopped attending, end-of-year data may not 
become available until more than a year after the student dropped out. Although the 
Department also uses termly attendance data recorded by the SLC to investigate issues 
emerging and to inform engagement with providers, these attendance data are not 
sufficiently reliable to be the basis of sanctions. A HESA project to improve timeliness 
by collecting reliable data during the academic year is expected to be fully implemented 
in 2019/20 (paragraph 2.21).
Student registration
16 The Department took action in five cases where new data‑matching checks 
identified non‑compliance with requirements to register students with the 
awarding body for Higher National courses, Edexcel. Between 2014/15 and 2016/17, 
the Department identified five non-compliant providers (out of between 18 and 35 
providers within the scope of the data-matching). The Department suspended payments 
for four providers while checks were being undertaken, and issued one with an 
improvement notice (paragraph 2.25).
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Quality of provision
17 The Department and partner organisations have taken action to address 
issues on quality of provision. Since 2015, all alternative providers must have had a 
successful Higher Education Review by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) in order 
to receive student support payments.3 The Department has revoked designation for 
student support payments from three providers on the basis of concerns raised by the 
QAA. In addition, since January 2015, the Department has investigated 14 providers 
where whistleblowers, data or engagement with partner organisations have raised 
concerns about quality of teaching (paragraphs 2.27 to 2.29).
Oversight of the alternative provider sector
18 Since we reported in 2014, the Department has taken steps to strengthen its 
oversight framework. In particular, providers’ designation for student funding is limited 
to one year and the Department undertakes annual checks to reconfirm designation. 
Previously, designation for student support was not time limited. Alternative providers 
must now meet quality review requirements that are consistent with those met by 
HEFCE-funded providers, and provide comparable data to HESA. The Department has 
also developed a range of sanctions that it imposes on under-performing providers and 
has expanded counter-fraud activity (paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 and Figure 9).
19 In addition, the Department has increased its engagement with providers 
and its investigative capacity, and has taken action where it has had concerns. 
In 2015 the Department, along with HEFCE, established a joint Alternative Provider 
Intelligence Unit, which as at September 2017 had 16 staff members. In 2016, it 
developed risk-based engagement plans with all providers. Between January 2015 
and November 2016, the unit considered 32 potential investigations, of which 31 are 
now closed. Overall, the Department has taken action against providers in more than 
30 cases where its investigations or data on, for example, non-continuation rates, have 
identified providers who are not performing at expected levels (paragraphs 3.2 to 3.6).
Assessing whether government is achieving its policy objectives 
20 The government’s policy of expanding the alternative provider sector 
appears to be widening access to under‑represented groups. The Department 
is developing its data collection approach and does not yet have full data to allow 
it to evaluate the policy impact. Nevertheless, data for 2015/16 from HESA show 
that 55% of alternative provider students are over 24 years old (compared with 
22% at HEFCE-funded providers) and 52% come from ethnically diverse groups 
compared with 22% at HEFCE-funded providers (paragraph 4.5).
3 The QAA is a not-for-profit body independent of government that monitors and advises the public on standards and 
quality in UK higher education.
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21 However, early indications are that graduates who studied at alternative 
providers have lower rates of progression into employment or further study, 
and lower salaries than graduates of HEFCE‑funded providers. In July 2017, the 
Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey included, for the first 
time, data for all alternative providers with undergraduate designated courses. For 
2015/16, 84% of alternative provider graduates were working or studying six months 
after graduating, with a median salary of £20,500. In comparison, 90% of graduates 
who studied at HEFCE-funded providers were working or studying six months after 
graduating, with a median salary of £21,500 (paragraph 4.9).
22 Appendix Three presents the actions taken by the Department to address the 
recommendations the Committee of Public Accounts made in 2015 on the basis of 
our 2014 report. 
Conclusion
23 The Department has made progress towards addressing weaknesses in its 
oversight of the alternative provider sector in response to our 2014 report and the 
Committee of Public Accounts’ 2015 recommendations. For example, the Department 
has strengthened its oversight framework and it has suspended or revoked payments 
to providers where intelligence from third parties or its own analysis has identified 
under-performing or non-compliant providers. In addition, there are indications that 
expansion of the alternative provider sector has helped widen access to higher 
education for unrepresented groups of students. 
24 However, the Department still has important issues to address before it can provide 
assurance that it has a firm grip on current or emerging problems. While the Department 
has reduced the number of ineligible payments to students at alternative providers, it does 
not have sufficiently timely and specific data to allow prompt measurement of the level 
of ineligible payments or analysis of trends. The rate of students at alternative providers 
who drop out of their courses has fallen, but it remains much higher than in the rest of the 
higher education sector. Furthermore, the Department also lacks reliable and timely data 
on non-continuation rates so does not impose prompt sanctions on under-performers. 
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Recommendations
25 The Higher Education and Research Act, which received Royal Assent in April 2017, 
will change the way higher education is regulated. In future, English higher education 
providers, including alternative providers, will be registered by the new Office for Students 
(OfS). The OfS will take a risk-based approach to regulation, focusing its attention on 
providers which represent most risk to student interest and value to the taxpayer. 
26 Our recommendations are aimed at supporting the Department and the new OfS 
as part of continuing efforts to take a data-driven approach to manage the alternative 
provider sector and to develop a data strategy for alternative providers, a group where 
some providers present risks. As responsibility for regulating alternative providers 
transfers from the Department to the OfS, there will continue to be a need for timely, 
reliable and specific data that allows early warning of issues emerging in the sector. 
We recommend: 
a As part of wider action to improve the SLC’s information systems, the 
Department should work with the SLC to strengthen analysis of applications 
and payments data for students attending alternative providers to support 
early detection of issues emerging and enable analysis of the reasons ineligible 
payments are made, so that controls can be tightened where needed. 
b The Department should work with HESA to ensure that its project to improve 
data on higher education providers will result in timely and reliable in‑year 
non‑continuation data that will allow the OfS to impose prompt sanctions on 
under-performing providers and on providers that do not submit accurate and 
timely data. 
c In developing and implementing the new regulatory framework, the OfS 
should drive further reduction in non‑continuation rates. It should take steps 
to address the underlying reasons why students with certain characteristics and 
backgrounds are less likely to complete their studies, by encouraging providers 
to take appropriate action and make effective support available to students at all 
providers where evidence suggests they are less likely to complete their studies.
d The Department should consider using alternative sources of data and new 
techniques to promptly identify problems in the sector. For example, the OfS 
could develop the National Student Survey further or work with HESA to develop 
methodologies that allow it to identify specific or emerging issues with quality.
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Part One
Background
1.1 Higher education in England is provided by institutions that receive a proportion of 
funding from the Department for Education (the Department) via the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE). They are referred to in this report as 
‘HEFCE-funded providers’. Higher education is also provided by institutions that do 
not receive any direct funding from HEFCE but may receive substantial public funding 
through student support. These institutions are referred to as ‘alternative providers’. As at 
September 2017, there were 112 alternative providers accessing student support funding.
1.2 Students in higher education can apply for student support, provided from public 
funds by the Student Loans Company (SLC). Student support from SLC is available 
only to students enrolled on courses approved or ‘designated’ by the Secretary of 
State. Eligible courses at HEFCE-funded providers are automatically designated, while 
alternative providers must apply to have their courses designated for student support. 
Each designation at an alternative provider relates to a specific course delivered at a 
specific location.
1.3 On 14 July 2016, the Department for Education assumed responsibility for higher 
education taking over from the then Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 
(which has since become the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy). 
In this report, we refer to the department with responsibility for higher education as 
‘the Department’.
Oversight of alternative providers
1.4 Alternative providers need to meet certain requirements to access public 
funding (Figure 1).
1.5 In June 2011, the government published a white paper that introduced measures 
designed to encourage diversity and competition in the higher education sector.4 Details 
of the resulting growth in the number of students at alternative providers receiving 
student support can be found in our 2014 report, Investigation into financial support for 
students at alternative higher education providers.5
4 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, white paper, 
CM 8122, June 2011.
5 Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Investigation into financial support for 
students at alternative higher education providers, Session 2014-15, HC 861, National Audit Office, December 2014.
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Figure 1 shows Access public funding
1.6 Since 2011, the expansion of the alternative provider sector has led to concerns 
about whether the current regulatory arrangements are fit for purpose. In its 2011 report 
on regulating higher education, the Committee of Public Accounts recommended that 
the Department should provide new powers to regulate institutions that receive little or 
no direct public funding, but whose students have access to publicly provided loans.6 
However, in 2012 the Department informed the Committee of Public Accounts that it 
would work within existing legislation rather than bring forward new legislation, and took 
steps to strengthen its processes for designating courses.
1.7 Although the Department still has limited regulatory powers over alternative 
providers, it has made access to premises, records and staff following fair notice 
a condition of designation for student support funding, with immediate access if it 
suspects fraudulent activity.
6 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Regulating financial sustainability in higher education, Thirty-sixth Report 
of Session 2010-12, HC 914, June 2011.
Figure 1
Access public funding
Key routes How it works
Course designation for 
student support
The Department for Education is responsible for deciding which 
providers and courses to designate. A course can only be designated 
if it meets the course eligibility criteria.
A provider wishing to recruit students who can claim support applies 
to the Department via the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
to have its courses designated. 
To have its courses designated, a provider must have had a 
recent successful review by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) 
for Higher Education.1  
A designated course must be accredited by a UK awarding body 
such as a university, City & Guilds (a not-for-profit chartered institute) 
or Edexcel (a private company). Awarding bodies offer qualifications. 
Providers need to meet the awarding body’s criteria in order to deliver 
its qualifications.
Application for and payment 
of student support funding
Students who meet eligibility requirements (eligible course and residency 
criteria for European Union students) may apply to the Student Loans 
Company (SLC) for tuition fee and maintenance loans if their course has 
been designated.
Once the student has enrolled at the provider, the provider confirms to 
the SLC at the start of each term that the student is attending. 
The provider also registers the student with the awarding body.
The SLC, following confirmation of the student’s attendance at the 
provider, makes maintenance payments to the student and tuition fee 
payments direct to the provider on a term-by-term basis.
Note
1  The QAA is a not-for-profi t body independent of government that monitors and advises the public on standards 
and quality in UK education.
Source: National Audit Offi ce
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1.8 In 2016, the government introduced a new Higher Education and Research Act 
that received Royal Assent on 27 April 2017. It will dissolve HEFCE and establish a new 
regulatory framework for higher education. In particular, a new Office for Students (OfS) 
will take on responsibility for funding and regulating higher education providers. The OfS 
will regulate all registered English higher education providers and therefore the Department 
will stop directly regulating alternative providers.
Concerns about support provided to students at some 
alternative providers
1.9 Our 2014 report examined the arrangements for oversight and funding of alternative 
higher education providers. It established a number of issues:
• European Union students at some alternative providers had claimed or attempted 
to claim support they were not entitled to.
• In 2012/13, non-continuation rates at nine alternative providers were higher than 
20%, compared with an average non-continuation rate of 4% in the rest of the 
higher education sector.
• About 20% of students enrolled in Higher National courses at alternative providers 
and claiming student support did not appear to have been registered with the 
qualification awarding body.
• There were instances of students on undesignated courses receiving support 
payments and providers supplying the SLC with incorrect information about 
student attendance.
1.10 In December 2014 and March 2015, the Committee of Public Accounts questioned 
the Accounting Officer about the evidence in the report. In February 2015, it published a 
report which recommended that the Department should:7
• systematically assess and control the specific risks identified by the National 
Audit Office and at its evidence session, and provide the Committee with a clear 
explanation on how it will manage these risks in future;
• report back to the Committee with an assessment of how much public money is 
at risk of being wasted;
• ensure that it has a much firmer grip on the quality of teaching and the standard 
students can expect in private sector higher education colleges, identify poor 
performers and take appropriate action to protect students and the sector as 
a whole; and
• set specific, measurable objectives for its policy [of expanding the alternative 
provider sector], and collect and analyse the right data in order to evaluate 
the full impact (see also Appendix Three).
7 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Financial support for students at alternative higher education providers, 
Forty-first Report of Session 2014-15, HC 811, February 2015.
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1.11 This report follows up the issues we reported on in 2014 and the progress 
that the Department has made in implementing the Committee of Public Accounts’ 
recommendations. Specifically, we examine the following:
• whether there are signs that the Department has resolved the specific issues 
we examined in 2014 (Part Two);
• whether the evolving oversight arrangements offer protection to taxpayers and 
students (Part Three); and
• whether the Department has assessed the effectiveness of the policy of expanding 
the alternative provider sector (Part Four).
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Part Two
Follow-up on major issues
2.1 This part of the report examines the current position on the major issues we 
identified  our 2014 report.
2.2 Since our previous report, the level of ineligible payments has fallen as a 
proportion of all payments to students attending alternative providers, from 4% in 
2012/13 to 0.5% in 2015/16, in line with the rate of ineligible payments across the 
higher education sector (0.8%).
2.3 The Department for Education (the Department) attributes this drop to new controls 
to prevent ineligible payments. In particular, it requires additional evidence to confirm 
that students meet residency requirements, and has tightened controls to prevent 
providers from recruiting students claiming student support onto undesignated courses. 
In addition, the Student Loans Company (SLC) analyses applications data on a daily 
basis to detect new problems emerging and aims to prevent ineligible payments from 
being made. In 2016, the Department established the Higher Education Fraud and Error 
Resilience Board to strengthen counter-fraud capability.
Payments to ineligible students
2014 position: payments to ineligible students
As at October 2014, the Student Loans Company had paid £5.4 million to 992 ineligible students from the 
European Union (EU) who it subsequently found had not met residency requirements.1
In February 2015, the Department informed the Committee of Public Accounts that it had made a total of 
£29 million ineligible payments between 2010/11 and 2013/14. This total included £16 million paid to EU 
students who had not demonstrated they met residency requirements.
Note
1 In 2014, EU students who had been resident in the UK for the previous three years, and migrant workers from 
EU member states, were eligible for maintenance and tuition fee support. EU students who had been resident in 
the European Economic Area (including Switzerland) for the previous three years, but not the UK, were eligible for 
tuition fee loans only. From 2016/17, EU students must have been resident in the UK for fi ve years to be eligible for 
maintenance support. Students who had not been resident in the UK or the European Economic Area are not eligible 
for student support.
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2.4 The Department considers that it has a proportionate and risk-based approach 
to monitoring the level of ineligible payments across the higher education sector. 
In particular, it carries out an annual audit to measure the overall rate of fraudulent or 
incorrect payments made to all providers. It considers that it would be disproportionate 
to design a system specifically for measuring ineligible payments to alternative providers, 
not least because the proportion of these payments has fallen substantially.
2.5 Therefore, the Department does not on a regular basis measure or analyse the level 
of ineligible payments made to students at alternative providers. Limitations in how the 
SLC records ineligible payments to students at alternative providers mean that it cannot 
readily analyse these data. With improved management information, the Department 
would increase its capacity to measure the level of ineligible payments in a timely manner, 
explore what might be behind trends, or act promptly to further tighten controls if there is 
a spike in ineligible payments.
2.6 At our request, the Department analysed ineligible payments to students at 
alternative providers as at January 2017:
• The SLC made ineligible payments totalling about £10 million in 2014/15 
and 2015/16.
• In the six years to 2015/16, the SLC made ineligible payments totalling £45 million.
• The Department has not recovered £36 million of the £45 million ineligible 
payments in the six years to 2015/16.
2.7 The Department could not, without further analysis, tell us the reasons why 
£19 million was paid to ineligible students, mostly since 2013/14 (Figure 2 overleaf). 
Although the SLC records the reason why each individual payment is ineligible, 
limitations in its information systems prevent it from routinely analysing the data 
without substantial data manipulation.
2.8 However, available evidence suggests a changing pattern in the reasons why 
ineligible payments to alternative providers are made. There are indications that 
payments to students who do not meet residency requirements is no longer the main 
reason for ineligible payments. Available data show that ineligible payments made to 
EU nationals as a proportion of all payments to EU nationals reduced from 13% in 
2012/13 to 0.5% in 2015/16.
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Figure 2
Ineligible payments to alternative providers and their students, January 2017
The Department has not analysed the reasons for around £10 million of ineligible payments it made in 2014/15 and 2015/16 
Reason not analysed 0 0.1 0.9 8.3 7.4 2.5
Other 0 0 0.1 0 0 0
Student count controls 0 0 0 0.4 0 0
Residency requirements 
     not satisfied
0 0.1 10.4 4.0 0 0
Unapproved or 
     undesignated course
0.1 0.2 5.4 3.6 0 0
Fraud 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 0 0
Note
1 Data are as at January 2017 and are subject to change. The level of ineligible payments made in 2015/16 and previous years could increase or 
decrease as, for example, the SLC identifi es further ineligible payments or students provide evidence of eligibility.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of the Student Loans Company data
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2014 position: growth in the alternative provider sector 
In 2014, we reported that, between 2010/11 and 2013/14, the alternative provider sector had grown 
substantially and that growth was concentrated in a small number of providers. Student support payments 
rose from around £50 million in 2010/11 to around £631 million in 2013/14. 
In November 2013, the Department instructed the 23 fastest-growing alternative providers to stop recruiting 
funded students. For the 2014/15 academic year, the Department imposed student number controls for all 
alternative providers.
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2.9 Since the Department imposed student number controls, student support 
payments and numbers of students at alternative providers have reduced. Support 
payments to full-time students fell from a peak of £724 million in 2013/14 to £417 million 
in 2015/16. The number of full-time students at alternative providers receiving student 
support also dropped from a peak of 51,000 in 2013/14 to 34,000 in 2015/16 (Figure 3). 
The Department told us that it does not have a target size for the alternative provider 
sector as its aim is to manage a demand-led sector, routinely using student number 
controls, both to enable controlled growth in quality degree-level providers, and as a 
sanction to limit the size of poorly performing providers.
Figure 3
Students receiving support at alternative providers, 2011/12 to 2015/16
 Number of students at alternative providers  12,000 32,000 51,000 42,000 34,000 
  receiving full-time student support   
 Total full-time student support paid (£m)   123 419 724 615 417
Notes
1 Data for academic year 2015/16 are provisional.
2 Number of students are rounded to the nearest 1,000.
3 Student support paid includes all types of support (tuition fee loans, maintenance loans and maintenance grants).
Source: National Audit Office analysis of published Student Loans Company data
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This box shows Non-continuation rates
Trend in non-continuation rates
2.10 Since we reported in 2014, HEFCE has developed an analysis of indicative 
non-continuation rates which addresses some of the limitations we noted at that time.8 
HEFCE’s analysis identifies students who did not return in the following academic year and 
is broadly consistent with how HESA calculates non-continuation rates for HEFCE-funded 
providers. HEFCE indicative non-continuation rates use SLC data, whereas HESA uses 
data reported to it by each provider. HEFCE developed its analysis in the absence of 
HESA non-continuation data for alternative providers, which would not be available 
until March 2017. More information is available in Appendix Two.
2.11 HEFCE has also calculated the non-continuation rate which would be expected 
for the alternative provider sector given overall non-continuation rates and certain 
characteristics of the alternative provider student population, such as students’ age 
and the subjects they are studying. This benchmark rate allows the Department to 
understand the extent to which differences from the average can be explained by 
factors that are known to affect non-continuation.
2.12 Indicative non-continuation rates at alternative providers have reduced over time, 
on average, but remain higher than the benchmark rate for the sector. Since 2012/13 
(the previous position we reported), the non-continuation rate for the alternative provider 
sector has dropped by 13 percentage points, from 38% in 2012/13 to 25% in 2014/15. 
However, the non-continuation rate in 2014/15 was three percentage points higher than 
the benchmark for the alternative provider sector (22%) (Figure 4).9
8 Our 2014 analysis allowed us to identify providers with high in-year non-continuation rates but it had known limitations, 
which we acknowledged but could not address with the information available at that time. In particular, we identified 
students who dropped out during the academic year but the analysis did not capture students who did not return 
the following year. We also knew that the analysis did not account for differences in student characteristics between 
alternative providers and HEFCE-funded providers. For example, alternative providers have higher proportions of students 
from under-represented groups, such as older students and students from black, asian and minority ethnic groups. 
Data across the higher education sector show that these groups are more likely to withdraw from higher education.
9 For completeness, and despite the methodological limitations, we re-performed the analysis in our 2014 report and 
found similar trends. Details are at Appendix Two.
Non-continuation rates
2014 position: non-continuation rates 
Average in-year non-continuation rates were higher for alternative providers accessing student support 
than for Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)-funded providers.1 Our analysis of SLC 
data showed that average in-year non-continuation rates for full-time students accessing student support 
in 2012/13 were 12% for students in alternative providers and 4% for students in HEFCE-funded providers. 
Nine providers had in-year non-continuation rates higher than 20%, all of which were alternative providers. 
Our 2014 report noted that the Department had not defined an expectation of what might constitute an 
acceptable non-continuation rate for providers that benefit from tuition fee loans.
Note
1 In-year non-continuation rates measure the proportion of students who dropped out during their academic year as 
indicated by the withdrawal of student support funding. In March 2017, Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) 
published non-continuation rates which measure the proportion of students who did not return for their following 
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2.13 The benchmark indicative non-continuation rate is much higher for alternative 
providers (22%) than for providers funded by HEFCE (10%). This is because alternative 
providers have more students with characteristics associated with high non-continuation 
which has pushed up the sector benchmark rate in the alternative provider sector.
Figure 4
Trends in indicative non-continuation rates in the higher education sector, 2012/13 to 2014/15
Non-continuation rate (%)
Notes
1 HEFCE-funded providers are providers that receive funding from the Higher Eudcation Funding Council for England (HEFCE).
2 Benchmark rate is the non-continuation rate expected for the sector after taking into account differences in certain characteristics such as 
students’ age and subjects studied. 
3 Because HEFCE-funded providers have most students in the higher education sector, their performance contribute disproportionately to 
the benchmark non-continuation rate. This is why the benchmark and sector non-continuation rates for HEFCE-funded providers are very similar.
4 For alternative providers, the difference between the sector non-continuation rate and the sector's benchmark rate is statistically significant 
in 2012/13 and 2014/15. The difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero in 2013/14.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of indicative non-continuation rates calculated by Higher Education Funding Council for England from 
Student Loans Company data
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Non-continuation rates by provider
2.14 In March 2017, HESA published non-continuation data for alternative providers 
for the first time in line with data published for the HEFCE-funded sector.10 For each 
of 57 alternative providers, HESA published the actual non-continuation rate and 
the benchmark non-continuation rate that takes into account the characteristics of 
the individual provider’s student population (including age and subjects studied).11 
The Department compared each provider’s actual performance with its benchmark 
to identify poorly performing providers.
2.15 The three largest alternative providers have non-continuation rates significantly 
worse than their benchmark rates. In 2014/15, analysis of 57 providers showed that:
• 10 providers (18%) had non-continuation rates significantly better than their 
benchmarks. Two of these providers had more than 500 undergraduate 
students starting courses. Differences from their benchmarks ranged 
from four to 17 percentage points (purple and green markers in Figure 5 
on pages 23 and 24);
• 11 providers (19%) had non-continuation rates significantly worse than their 
benchmarks. Three of these providers were among the largest alternative 
providers. Differences from their benchmarks ranged from five to 55 percentage 
points (red and orange markers in Figure 5); and
• 36 providers (63%) had non-continuation rates that were not significantly 
different from their benchmarks.
2.16 In the HEFCE-funded sector, 12 providers (8%) had non-continuation rates 
significantly worse than their benchmarks in 2014/15, with differences ranging 
from three to 27 percentage points.
10 HESA non-continuation rates supersede HEFCE indicative non-continuation rates, which HEFCE developed as an 
interim measure in the absence of HESA analysis for the alternative provider sector.
11 HESA performed this analysis for the 57 providers that had more than 23 students starting and who were required to 
submit non-continuation data for 2014/15.
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Figure 5
Difference in non-continuation rates from benchmark, by alternative provider, 2014/15
Eleven providers have non‑continuation rates worse than their benchmarks
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Sanctions imposed on providers with high non-continuation rates
2.17 The Department uses data on non-continuation rates as the basis for sanctions 
on under-performing providers. It issued improvement notices to 14 providers with 
high indicative non-continuation rates in 2012/13 and 2013/14.
2.18 To make consistent decisions on sanctions in relation to non-continuation rates for 
2014/15, the Department used a framework comparing providers’ non-continuation rates 
with individual benchmarks based on each provider’s student population. The framework 
also considered the absolute non-continuation performance of each provider.
2.19 The Department has taken action against all 11 providers with non-continuation 
rates in 2014/15 that were higher than their individual benchmarks (Figure 6 on 
pages 26 and 27). In addition, the Department issued an improvement notice in one 
case where the provider’s non-continuation rate was not significantly different from 
its benchmark but was deemed unacceptably high in absolute terms.
Notes
1 The provider’s benchmark is the non-continuation rate after taking into account differences in student characteristics 
(including age and subjects studied).
2 The chart only reports providers for which differences to their benchmarks are statistically signifi cant.
3 HESA publishes non-continuation rates separately for fi rst degree and other undergraduate provision. A fi rst degree is 
an undergraduate degree, commonly a Bachelor’s degree. Other undergraduate provision includes foundation degrees 
and Higher Nationals.
4 BPP had non-continuation rates worse than its benchmark in ‘fi rst degree’ qualifi cations, and better than its benchmark 
in the ‘other undergraduate provision’. BPP had around 1,000 undergraduates starting courses in 2014/15 for each of 
the two types of qualifi cations .
5 Thirty-six providers had non-continuation rates that were not signifi cantly different from their benchmarks. Differences 
may be statistically insignifi cant either because the difference between the non-continuation rate and the benchmark 
is small or because the number of students attending the provider is low.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of published Higher Education Statistics Agency data
a GSM London Limited
b BPP University Limited
c BPP University Limited (2)
d BIMM Limited
e London School of Business and Finance 
(UK) Limited
f ICON College of Technology and Management
g SAE Education Limited
h Nelson College London Limited
i UCK Limited
j Mont Rose College of Management 
and Sciences
k City of London College
l Grafton College
m Brit College
n Regent College
o London School of Management Education
p St Mellitus College
q London College of Creative Media Limited
r The College of Integrated Chinese Medicine
s ABI College Limited
t Access to Music Limited
u Chicken Shed Theatre Company
Figure 5 continued
Difference in non-continuation rates from benchmark, by alternative 
provider, 2014/15
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2.20 The HESA data do not allow us to analyse and confirm the reasons 
for non-continuation in each case, which will differ by student and provider. 
Non-continuation rates reflect a range of potential factors:
• Student characteristics such as age and subjects studied. These are taken 
into account by the benchmarking analysis.
• Student characteristics such as students’ socio-economic background and 
working status. These are not taken into account by the benchmarking analysis.
• Non-continuation rates may reflect factors besides differences in student 
characteristics. High non-continuation rates may also be an indication of 
the quality of the education and support at the institution, the capability 
and motivation of students, or inappropriate recruitment by the provider.
Limitations in using end-of-year data
2.21 The Department is not able to impose sanctions on under-performing providers 
promptly because it uses end-of-year non-continuation rate data as the basis of sanctions. 
Depending on when a student stopped attending, this end-of-year non-continuation data 
may not be available for more than a year after the student dropped out. This is because 
information on students who did not return for a subsequent year of their studies can be 
derived only after providers have submitted enrolment data to HESA at the end of that 
subsequent academic year. The Department has told us that HESA has a project under 
way to enable data collection during the academic year, which should help address 
reporting time-lags. Full implementation is expected for 2019/20.
2.22 The Department informed us that it uses termly data on attendance held by the 
SLC to monitor providers and investigate emerging issues. The Department also told 
us that these data are not sufficiently reliable to be the basis of sanctions, because they 
only capture in-year withdrawals, and because some providers are better than others at 
providing attendance data to the SLC in a timely manner.
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<Multiple intersecting links>
2.23 In response to a recommendation from the Committee of Public Accounts, the 
Department has, since July 2016, required that the level of English language spoken by 
students attending funded courses is at least ‘competent user’. We checked compliance 
by reviewing the websites of a risk-based sample of 21 alternative providers and found 
that 19 were compliant. However, we identified two providers whose websites indicated 
they would recruit students whose English-language proficiency falls below ‘competent 
user’ (4th column of Figure 7 overleaf). They are Mont Rose College and The London 
College UCK. In early 2017, the Department contacted the providers who said that their 
websites were in error and agreed to update their websites immediately.
Notes
1 Alternative providers are ordered by their actual (absolute) non-continuation rates.
2 The provider’s benchmark is the non-continuation rate after taking into account differences in student characteristics (including age and 
subjects studied).
3 A fi rst degree is an undergraduate degree, commonly a Bachelor’s degree. Other undergraduate provision includes foundation degrees 
and Higher Nationals.
4 For the purposes of this fi gure, provider names have been shortened as follows: SAE Education Limited (SAE); London School of Business and Finance 
(UK) Ltd (LSBF); London College of Creative Media Limited (LCCM); ABI College Limited (ABI); College of Integrated Chinese Medicine (CICM); UCK Limited 
(UCK); Access to Music Limited (Access to Music); GSM London Limited (GSM); BPP University Limited (BPP); BIMM Limited (BIMM).
5 City of London and LSBF are no longer designated for student support due to previous issues rather than 2014/15 non-continuation rates.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of published Higher Education Statistics Agency data
Figure 6 continued
Alternative providers with non-continuation rates above their benchmarks, 2014/15
English language requirements
2014 position: English language requirements
The Department had not established minimum entry requirements for proficiency in the English language. 
We reported that 18 of 23 providers whose websites we reviewed required minimum English language 
proficiency below ‘competent user’ level.1
Note
1 ‘Competent user’ is defi ned by the International English Language Test System as a person who has generally effective 
command of the language despite some inaccuracies and misunderstandings in some situations. They can use and 
understand fairly complex language, particularly in familiar situations.
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2.24 Students at alternative providers attending designated courses and wishing to 
claim student support from the SLC must register with a qualification awarding body.
2.25 In 2015, in response to a recommendation from the Committee of Public Accounts, 
the Department put in place an annual exercise to check whether students claiming 
student support for Higher National courses were registered with the awarding body 
Edexcel. In 2015/16, one-third of the student population at alternative providers were 
taking Higher National qualifications. The Department took action in the five cases where 
data checks identified discrepancies in the three academic years to 2016/17 (out of 
between 18 and 35 providers within the scope of the data-matching). The Department 
suspended payments to four providers while checks were being undertaken and issued 
one with an improvement notice.
Figure 7
English language requirements published by a sample of alternative 
providers, 2014 and 2016
19 out of 21 providers we sampled in 2016 were compliant with English language requirements
CEFR 
level
IELTS level IELTS description Providers checked 
in December 2016 
Providers checked 
when we reported 
in 2014
C1-C2 7.0 and above Good user 0 0
B2 5.5–6.5 Competent user 19 5
B1 5 Modest user 2 11
B1 4.5 and below Limited user 0 3
No language requirement specified on website 
or application form
0 4
Total 21 23
Notes
1 CEFR stands for Common European Framework of Reference for languages.
2 IELTS stands for International English Language Test System.
3 Appendix Two explains our methodology.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
Registration with awarding bodies 
2014 position: registration with awarding bodies 
About 20% of students on Higher National courses recruited by alternative providers and claiming student 
support were not registered with the qualification awarding body. Even though providers were required to 
register their students with the relevant body, the Department did not then have mechanisms in place to 
check whether they had done so.
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This box shows the Quality of provision
2.26 The Department does not perform any checks to determine whether supported 
students are registered with awarding bodies other than Edexcel. Around two-thirds 
of undergraduates at alternative providers in 2015/16 attended courses other than 
Higher Nationals which are qualified by, for example, City & Guilds or HEFCE-funded 
providers. These students must register with the relevant awarding bodies in order 
to attain their qualification but there are no mechanisms for checking that students 
claiming student support have been registered. However, the Department considers 
the risk of non-registration to be lower where courses are qualified by HEFCE-funded 
providers, who will ensure that alternative providers operate in line with their established 
arrangements and expectations.
2.27 Quality assessment is one of the key criteria the Department requires alternative 
providers to satisfy in order to be designated to receive public funds through student 
support payments. Since September 2015, all providers must have had a successful 
Higher Education Review by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), have maintained their 
relationship with the QAA and have met expected standards during annual monitoring.
2.28 In 2015 and 2016 the QAA conducted annual reviews of 53 alternative providers. 
It also conducts full risk-based reviews of alternative providers on a four-yearly basis. 
To decide timing and length of the full review, the QAA takes into account the provider’s 
size, complexity of delivery and concerns it has identified through desk review. QAA 
engages directly with students as part of its reviews, inviting a student submission, 
meeting with students and including students from a different provider in most review 
teams. QAA completed full reviews of 23 alternative providers between 2013 and 2015. 
Since 2015, the Department has revoked designation for student support payments 
from three providers on the basis of concerns raised by the QAA.
2.29 Since January 2015, the Department has investigated 14 providers where 
whistleblowers, data and engagement with partner organisations raised concerns 
about quality of teaching. The Department revoked designation for student support 
payments from three of these providers where these concerns were substantiated.
Quality of provision
2014 position: quality of provision
Our 2014 report did not address issues of teaching quality. However, in February 2015, the Committee of 
Public Accounts recommended that the Department needed to have a firmer grip on the quality of teaching 
in the sector and that it needed to identify poor performers and take appropriate action to protect students 
and the sector as a whole.
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2.30 In 2017, participation in the National Student Survey was mandatory for the first 
time for alternative providers. This survey asked final-year students whether they were 
satisfied with the quality of their course. Each provider was then measured against 
a benchmark which took into account the characteristics of the provider’s student 
population such as age and subjects studied:
• 20% of alternative providers had satisfaction rates significantly better than their 
benchmark compared with 9% of HEFCE-funded providers;
• 9% of alternative providers had satisfaction rates significantly worse than their 
benchmark compared with 15% of HEFCE-funded providers; and
• 71% of alternative providers had satisfaction rates not significantly different from 
their benchmarks, compared with 76% of HEFCE-funded providers.
2.31 There is scope for the Department to supplement the current mechanisms for 
detecting quality issues (QAA reviews and the National Student Survey) with more 
timely indicators that could act as real-time warning flags of problems emerging. 
HESA’s project to enable data collection within the academic year could be an 
opp rtunity to develop more timely data on student satisfaction or quality.
2.32 Since 2015, the Department has investigated seven cases of potentially 
inappropriate recruitment practices. In four cases it concluded that the allegations were 
unsubstantiated and in three cases applied sanctions.
2.33 Since our 2014 report there has been a changing trend in the nature of 
recruitment advertising at alternative providers. We examined advertising posted on 
social media in 2015 and 2016 for a risk-based sample of 32 alternative providers. 
We identified 18 advertisements emphasising student support or offering incentives 
to students (Figure 8).
Recruitment practices
2014 position: recruitment practices 
Some alternative providers were advertising ‘free tuition’ as a way to recruit students. The Department 
had concerns that some alternative providers were inappropriately using recruitment agents in the UK and 
overseas. The Department did not conduct a specific investigation but considered recruitment practices 
alongside other issues when investigating ‘high risk’ individual providers.
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2.34 The Department informed us that it responds on a case-by-case basis where 
providers are offering incentives such as iPads or vouchers. Use of such incentives 
is common for all providers across both the HEFCE-funded and alternative provider 
sector and the Department considers it to be a legitimate marketing tool if a provider 
is otherwise performing well (for example, passing quality reviews, reporting low 
non-continuation rates). The Department told us that where offering recruitment 
incentives is part of a pattern of issues, it would consider what action is needed.
Figure 8
Recruitment advertising posted by a sample of alternative providers, 
2015 and 2016
None of the advertisements we identified that were posted in 2016 gave prominence to the 
availability of student support funding
Nature of advertisement Number posted
in 2015
Number posted
in 2016
Advertisements giving prominence to the availability 
of student support
7 0
Advertisements offering incentives such as free iPads to new 
students and vouchers to current students for referring a friend
3 8
Note
1 Appendix Two explains our methodology.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
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Part Three
Oversight of the alternative provider sector
3.1 This part of the report examines how the Department for Education’s 
(the Department’s) oversight of the alternative provider sector has evolved 
since we reported in 2014.
Oversight and sanctions
3.2 Since we reported in 2014, the Department has taken steps to strengthen its 
oversight of alternative providers to help improve the quality of education they offer 
(Figure 9 on pages 33 and 34). In particular, in 2015 it established the joint Alternative 
Provider Intelligence Unit (the Intelligence Unit) with the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) to increase engagement with providers and investigative 
capacity. The Intelligence Unit has made more than 150 formal visits to providers 
at their premises since 2015, which primarily aimed to provide support and ensure 
understanding of the regulatory framework.
3.3 Since our 2014 report, the Department has also developed its approach to 
imposing sanctions on alternative providers. Sanctions now include:
• Improvement notice. The Department formally puts the provider under notice 
that it must bring aspects of performance up to required standards or face 
further sanctions.
• Suspension of payments. Payments are suspended while the Department 
investigates or until the issues have been addressed.
• Partial re‑designation. Specific courses are no longer available for student support.
• Student number controls. Additional limits on the numbers of students able to 
access student support funding can be imposed on under-performing providers 
and lifted when performance improves.
• Full de‑designation. The alternative provider is no longer eligible for 
student support.
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Figure 9
Key changes in oversight arrangements since 2014
Establishment of the Alternative Provider Intelligence Unit
In 2015 the Department set up the joint Alternative Provider Intelligence Unit (the Intelligence Unit) 
with the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE): 
• The Intelligence Unit investigates and responds to issues in the alternative provider sector. 
• The Intelligence Unit engages directly with all alternative providers, irrespective of known concerns, in 
order to gather sector intelligence and support regulatory compliance across the sector. In 2016 the 
Intelligence Unit developed engagement plans with all providers tailored to the provider’s level of risk.
• As at September 2017, it had 16 staff, including eight staff from HEFCE and eight from the Department.
Changes to the requirements for designating alternative providers for student support
From 2015, the Department committed to reviewing designation for student support for all providers 
on an annual basis. Previously, designation for student support was not time limited. New designation 
conditions included:
• providers are required to register students with the awarding body before confirming student 
attendance to the Student Loans Company (SLC) for the purpose of receiving student support funding;
• a fit and proper person test for alternative provider directors; and
• access for the Department to alternative providers’ premises, records and staff following fair notice, 
or immediate access if the Department suspects fraudulent activity.
In addition, the Department requires evidence of processes to ensure student proficiency in English 
for 2017/18 onwards.
Changes to the quality review framework
Quality assessment is one of the four key criteria required for designation for student support. Changes 
since 2015 include:
• alternative providers are subject to the Higher Education Review Quality Framework, a risk-based 
approach to quality that applies across all UK providers of higher education. Providers must maintain 
their relationship with the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and meet expected standards during 
annual monitoring;
• all providers must achieve a successful Higher Education Review. The QAA’s annual review informs 
the Department’s decision on whether to designate the alternative providers for student support and 
is a prerequisite for new designations; and
• in addition, a full QAA review of each provider is undertaken every four years.
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This box shows the Investigations
3.4 There are a range of scenarios where the Department may take action against 
providers. These include responding to major issues set out in Part Two such as high 
non-continuation rates, providers that have not registered students with qualification 
awarding bodies, concerns about quality, or other breaches of designation. Since 2015, the 
Department has suspended student support payments to 19 providers under investigation. 
Overall, it has taken action in more than 30 cases where its investigations, data or other 
engagement have identified providers who are not performing at expected levels.
Investigations
2014 position: investigative capacity  
The Department had no rights of access to alternative providers. Alternative providers were not subject to 
the same regulatory framework as HEFCE-funded providers. There was only one occasion on which the 
Department had carried out investigative work on a provider’s premises.
Subscription to Office of the Independent Adjudicator
• Since 2015, all providers with course designation for student support are required to subscribe 
to the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (OIA). The OIA handles student 
complaints against alternative providers.
Data collection requirements
From 2017, new published annual data on alternative providers will include:
• Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) non-continuation rates for alternative providers calculated 
in the same way as for the HEFCE-funded sector;
• National Student Survey data on students’ experience; and
• Destination of Leavers from Higher Education survey data on destinations of graduates and 
the salaries they earn.
Counter‑fraud activity
Expansion of the SLC counter-fraud services team: 
• New investigations teams work with analysts to identify unusual patterns or clusters of activity 
from particular providers.
• Providers are monitored on a risk basis to ensure that known patterns and behaviours by providers 
and students are not repeated.
• SLC carry out random sampling to identify any previously unknown fraudulent behaviours. 
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
Figure 9 continued
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3.5 Of 32 potential investigations the Intelligence Unit considered between 
January 2015 and November 2016, 31 are now closed, 13 of which were 
unsubstantiated. More than half of the investigations were triggered by whistleblowers. 
In considering the handling of investigations, the Intelligence Unit works closely 
with the Department’s Student Finance Investigations Team, the Government 
Internal Audit Agency and the QAA. The Intelligence Unit draws on other information 
including SLC data on attendance and also benefits from its engagement with 
partner organisations including Edexcel and the QAA and with individual providers 
(Figure 10). Figure 11 overleaf shows the various concerns investigated.
3.6 We carried out a detailed review of five out of 32 investigations considered by the 
Department since 2015. These provide a range of issues and information sources to 
allow us to examine what had triggered the investigation, how it was investigated and the 
outcomes. A summary of three of these investigations that were concluded at the point 
we carried ut our fieldwork is at Figure 12 on page 37.
Figure 10
Triggers for the Department’s investigations considered between 
January 2015 and November 2016 
Whistleblowers were among the triggers of 21 out of the Department’s 32 investigations
Note
1 Some investigations have multiple triggers, which is why the number of triggers total more than the 32 investigations.  
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Education data
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Figure 11
Concerns investigated for the cases considered between January 2015 
and November 2016
English language
Bogus awarding body
Fraud
Ineligible payments
Recruitment practices
Students’ attendance of 
undesignated courses
Course misrepresentation on 
provider’s website
Quality of teaching
12108642 14 160
Quality of teaching was among the concerns investigated in 14 out of the Department’s 
32 investigations
Number of concerns
Note
1 Some investigations raise multiple concerns, which is why the number of concerns total more than the 
32 investigations.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Department for Education data
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Figure 12
Examples of provider cases logged by the Intelligence Unit
Provider Source of 
intelligence
Investigating 
organisation(s)
Summary of events and issues Outcome
Provider A Whistleblowers 
to Quality 
Assurance Agency 
(QAA) (May 2015) 
and the Department 
(January 2016)
QAA;
Government 
Internal Audit 
Agency (GIAA)
Concerns about: quality of teaching; 
recruitment; drop-outs; funding paid 
for students not attending or not 
registered with the awarding body.
GIAA found no evidence of fraud 
or malpractice regarding student 
loan funding.
QAA found that other concerns 
were justified.
Student Loans Company (SLC) 
suspended all tuition fee payments. 
These were reinstated following 
completion of an action plan. 
Designation for 2015/16 granted with 
reduced student number control. 
Designation for 2016/17 with student 
number control restored, following 
assurance from a QAA review.
Provider B Whistleblower to 
the Department 
(July 2015)
Intelligence Unit The Department received a number 
of allegations from a whistleblower. 
The Department interviewed the 
whistleblower and requested 
supporting evidence, but none 
was provided. 
The whistleblower later withdrew 
the allegations. 
Provider C Whistleblower 
to QAA 
(August 2015)
Not applicable Allegations included concerns about 
English language requirements.
Similar allegations had been raised 
in 2014; these had been investigated 
by QAA, which found no evidence 
of wrongdoing.
The whistleblower did not provide 
evidence to support the allegations.
The Department discussed the 
allegations with QAA, GIAA and 
SLC. They agreed not to launch 
an investigation but to discuss the 
provider’s approach to English language 
requirements during the Intelligence 
Unit’s next visit to the provider.
Notes
1 The names of the providers are not published in order to protect the identity of whistleblowers.
2 The examples above are three of the 32 cases logged by the Intelligence Unit for triage or investigation between January 2015
and November 2016. No signifi cance should be attributed to the selection of these cases over the other 29 on the list.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Department for Education data.
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Part Four
Achieving the policy objectives of 
expanding the alternative provider sector
4.1 This part of the report examines the progress government has made in achieving 
policy objectives through expanding the alternative provider sector.
The policy objectives
4.2 In 2011, the Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System white paper 
set out the policy objectives for the higher education sector.12 Its objectives include 
promoting fair access by attracting under-represented groups including part-time 
students. It also set out a desire to open up the higher education market, including 
to alternative providers, to meet the changing needs of employers, individuals and 
their communities.
4.3 In 2015, the government consulted on steps to boost competition and choice in 
higher education and strengthen regulation. The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 
received Royal Assent in April 2017 and provided the legislative basis for:
• a single regulator, the Office for Students, to oversee all types of higher education 
providers, including alternative providers (see paragraph 1.8);
• sector regulation to drive competition and choice; and
• a risk-based approach to the regulation of all higher education providers to 
focus attention where it is needed to improve quality.
Assessing achievement of objectives
2014 position: assessment of objectives
Our 2014 report did not examine whether the policy objectives were achieved. However, the Committee of 
Public Accounts recommended, in February 2015, that the Department for Education should set measurable 
objectives for its policy of expanding the alternative provider sector and that it should collect and analyse the 
right data to evaluate the impact of this policy.
12 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, white paper, 
Cm 8122, June 2011.
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4.4 The Department for Education (the Department) has taken steps to bring data 
collection for alternative providers in line with the data collected for the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE)-funded sector on students’ demographics and 
outcomes. The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) published the first data on 
employment outcomes in July 2017 for students at alternative providers who graduated 
in 2015/16. HESA has also collected statistics on demographics of students at alternative 
providers for academic years 2014/15 and 2015/16. We examined this information to assess 
whether there are early signs that government is achieving its policy objectives.
Increasing diversity
4.5 In 2015/16, undergraduate student population at alternative providers, as compared 
with the HEFCE-funded sector was:
• more ethnically diverse: black, Asian and minority ethnic students represented 
52% of undergraduates at alternative providers, compared with 22% at 
HEFCE-funded providers;
• older: 55% of undergraduate student at alternative providers were over 
24 years old, compared with 22% at HEFCE-funded providers; and
• more gender balanced: 50% of undergraduates at alternative providers 
were male, compared with 44% at HEFCE-funded providers.
4.6 These statistics can be illustrated by the example in Figure 13.
Figure 13
Example of diversity at alternative providers
Alternative provider Example of diversity
London School of Management
Education (LSME)
Around 75% of LSME students are over 30 years old and 
35% are aged 41 to 50. Most students live locally and many have 
prior work experience and/or work part-time. LSME provides 
individual support to its students, including well-being support 
and specific class arrangements to accommodate students’ 
individual professional and family circumstances. LSME has 
very low non-continuation rates at 2.1%, significantly below its 
benchmark of 16% (HESA data for 2014/15). LSME offers High 
National programmes in Business, Health and Social Care, and 
Diploma in Education and Training. 
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
<No data from link>
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Subjects studied
4.7 Alternative providers tend not to offer the same range of subjects as providers 
in the rest of the sector. In 2015/16:
• 10% of undergraduates at alternative providers studied science courses 
(46% in the HEFCE-funded sector);
• 48% of undergraduates at alternative providers attended business and 
administrative courses (13% in the HEFCE-funded sector); and
• 20% of undergraduates at alternative providers studied creative arts and design 
(9% in the HEFCE-funded sector).
4.8 Specific examples illustrating these statistics are given at Figure 14. 
While the Department does not have a specific policy objective for the subjects 
that students in receipt of support from the SLC should study, the trend may be 
worthy of further examination.
Outcomes
4.9 The Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey published 
in July 2017 presents, for the first time, information about destinations and salaries 
for undergraduate students who graduated from alternative providers in 2015/16 
comparable with the HEFCE-funded sector:13
• About 84% of alternative provider graduates were working or studying 
six months after graduating, compared with 90% for graduates who studied 
at HEFCE-funded providers.
• The overall median salary reported by alternative provider graduates with 
a full-time employment in the UK six months after graduating is £20,500 
compared with £21,500 for graduates who attended HEFCE-funded providers.
13 The results exclude non-EU domiciled students.
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Figure 14
Examples of subjects studied at alternative providers
Alternative provider Example of subject studied
City & Guilds of London Arts School Undergraduate and postgraduate courses in conservation 
studies, fine art and historic carving; one of only a few 
higher education providers in Europe offering specialist 
courses in ornamental woodcarving and gilding.
SAE Institute Accelerated Bachelor's degrees in creative media, 
including audio, film, games, animation, music business 
and web development.
Mountview Academy of Theatre Arts Undergraduate and postgraduate courses in acting, 
musical theatre and theatre production. 
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis
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Appendix One
Our audit approach
1 This report follows up the issues we and the Committee of Public Accounts 
reported on in 2014. Alternative providers are institutions offering higher education 
qualifications that do not receive direct funding from the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) but their students can access public funds through 
student support from the Student Loans Company (SLC).
2 Specifically, our follow-up report examines the following:
• Whether there are signs that the Department for Education (the Department) 
has resolved the major issues we identified in 2014.
• Whether the evolving oversight arrangements offer protection to taxpayers 
and students.
• Whether the Department has assessed the effectiveness of the policy of 
expanding the alternative provider sector.
3 We examined whether the Department has made sufficient progress in improving 
its control and oversight of the alternative higher education provider sector.
4 Our audit approach is summarised in Figure 15. Our evidence base is described 
in Appendix Two.
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Figure 15
Our audit approach
Our 2014 report
Our 2014 investigation identified a number of issues which suggested the Department did not have sufficient 
control of the alternative provider sector. These were: payments made to ineligible students; high drop-out rates at 
some providers; students receiving public support without being registered with the qualification awarding bodies; 
students attending undesignated courses; and providers reporting inaccurate student attendance.
Recommendations 
by the Committee 
of Public Accounts
In February 2015, the Committee of Public Accounts recommended that the Department needed to: quantify 
losses from funding ineligible students; systematically access and control risks identified in the 2014 National Audit 
Office report; gain a firmer grip on the quality of teaching in the sector; and set measurable objectives for its policy 
of expanding the alternative provider sector and collect the right data in order to evaluate their full impact.
Our study
This follow-up report examines whether the Department has made sufficient progress in improving its oversight 
and control of the alternative provider sector.
Our evaluative 
criteria Are there signs that the 
Department has resolved the 
major issues we identified 
in 2014?
Has the Department assessed 
whether the policy of expanding 
the alternative provider sector 
has been effective?
Do the evolving oversight 
arrangements for the alternative 
provider sector offer protection 
for taxpayers and students?
Our evidence
(see Appendix Two 
for details)
Our conclusions
The Department has made progress towards addressing weaknesses in its oversight of the alternative provider 
sector in response to our 2014 report and the Committee of Public Accounts’ 2015 recommendations, including 
strengthening its oversight framework and revoking payments to under-performing or non-compliant providers. 
However, the Department still has important issues to address. While it has reduced the number of ineligible 
payments to students at alternative providers, it does not have sufficiently timely and specific data to allow 
prompt measurement of the level of ineligible payments or analysis of trends. The rate of students at alternative 
providers who drop out of their courses has fallen, but remains much higher than in the rest of the higher 
education sector. Furthermore, the Department also lacks reliable and timely data on non-continuation rates 
so does not impose prompt sanctions on under-performers.
We examined the Department’s 
progress by:
• analysing data 
on payments to 
ineligible students and 
non-continuation rates 
over time;
• reviewing controls and 
checks on compliance; and
• engaging with officials 
at the Department and its 
partner organisations.
We assessed evolving oversight 
arrangements by:
• analysing data on 
investigations and sanctions;
• reviewing a sample of 
investigations;
• reviewing documents from 
oversight bodies; and
• reviewing websites of 
a sample of providers to 
check compliance.
We assessed the policy’s 
effectiveness by:
• analysing data on students’ 
demographics and 
employability, salaries and 
satisfaction with their learning 
experience; and
• reviewing case studies 
of providers supplemented 
by interviews.
  
Figure 15 shgws Our 
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Appendix Two
Our evidence base
1 We reached our independent conclusions on whether the Department for 
Education (the Department) has made sufficient progress in improving its control and 
oversight of the alternative higher education provider sector after analysing evidence 
collected between November 2016 and August 2017.
2 We drew on a variety of sources and methods. Our analytical audit approach is 
summarised in Appendix One.
3 We engaged with relevant individuals from the Department including the 
Alternative Providers Intelligence Unit (the Intelligence Unit) to establish how concerns 
come to their attention and how the Department responded.
4 We also consulted with the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) 
and the awarding body Edexcel to understand their roles in overseeing alternative providers 
and checking compliance with requirements for course designation for student support.
5 We reviewed case studies of eight alternative providers developed by the 
Department and conducted semi‑structured interviews with representatives from two 
alternative providers selected from that group. This gave us a deeper understanding 
of the impact of alternative providers on (a) widening access to higher education to 
under-represented groups and on (b) students’ outcomes.
6 We analysed data on the 32 investigations the Intelligence Unit conducted from 
January 2015 to November 2016. These allowed us to understand what concerns the 
Department investigated and the nature of actions and sanctions applied.
7 We examined a sample of five investigations. This gave us a deeper 
understanding of what triggered the investigations and the extent of the Department’s 
response to concerns and allegations. We limited the number of in-depth reviews to 
five due to the time available and the volume of documentation available for review. 
The five investigations were broadly representative of (a) the sources of information 
the Department drew upon; (b) the issues under investigation; and (c) the action the 
Department took following the investigation.
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8 We examined documents from the Department and oversight bodies that set 
out (a) the requirements for course designation for student support, and (b) controls 
and procedures the Department had in place to check compliance.
9 We analysed data on students’ demographics, destinations and salaries 
earned, and student satisfaction with their learning experience. This allowed us 
to examine the extent to which the Department is achieving the objectives for its policy 
of expanding the alternative provider sector and how it compares with the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)-funded sector. We analysed data on 
student’s demographics published by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). 
We analysed the data from the 2015/16 Destination of Leavers from Higher Education 
Survey and data from the National Student Survey 2017, which for the first time included 
data for all alternative providers with undergraduate courses designated for student 
support, comparable with similar data for the HEFCE-funded sector.
10 We analysed data on non‑continuation rates, or the proportion of students who 
did not return for their second year. The data available covered full-time undergraduate 
students. We used data prepared by HESA on behalf of HEFCE for students who 
entered in 2014/15, the only year available. We also used indicative non-continuation 
rates prepared by HEFCE for the period from 2012/13 to 2014/15 (now superseded by 
HESA analysis).14 The HESA non-continuation rates are official statistics submitted by the 
providers, which is subject to HESA’s quality assurance process.
11 HEFCE and HESA derived benchmark non-continuation rates for each alternative 
provider, but HESA uses a more sophisticated methodology which is in line with what it 
uses in the HEFCE-funded sector. Benchmark rates correspond to the non-continuation 
rates expected for each provider after correcting for differences in certain student 
characteristics. HESA’s benchmark rates correct for differences in students’ age, subjects 
studied and qualifications at entry.15 HEFCE indicative benchmark rates (now superceded 
by HESA’s) corrected for differences in students’ age, subjects studied and qualification 
aim (as opposed to qualification at entry).
12 The non-continuation data allowed us to understand trends and spot outlier 
providers in both the alternative provider sector and HEFCE-funded providers. 
We identified as outliers the alternative providers for which non-continuation rates were 
above the provider’s benchmark using the HESA data for 2014/15. We identified trends 
using the HEFCE indicative non-continuation rates.
14 HEFCE indicative non-continuation rates used the proportion of students who stopped receiving support from the 
Student Loan Company (SLC) in their second year as a proxy for non-continuation. These were produced as an interim 
measure in the absence of such analysis for the alternative provider sector and have now been superseded by HESA 
non-continuation rates.
15 HESA published guidance on UK performance indicators and benchmarks, available at: www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-
analysis/performance-indicators/benchmarks
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13 We re‑performed our 2014 analysis of in‑year non‑continuation rates using 
data from the SLC by individual alternative provider for the academic years from 2011/12 
to 2015/16. The results show a trend similar to that we found in the data analysis 
presented in Figure 4. We used the same methodology as explained in our 2014 report 
(Appendix One, paragraphs 7 and 8).16
14 We analysed unpublished SLC management data on payments to ineligible 
students. This allowed us to understand the amount of ineligible payments that the 
Department did not recover.
15 We analysed data on students receiving support at alternative providers and 
the amount of support over time. We analysed published SLC official statistics on the 
amount of support paid to full-time students at alternative providers and the amount 
of support paid from academic year 2011/12 to 2015/16. This analysis allowed us to 
understand growth in the alternative provider sector.
16 We reviewed the websites of a risk‑based sample of 21 alternative providers 
to check their compliance with the minimum entry requirements for student proficiency 
in the English language. The risk-based sample included the providers identified in our 
2014 report, as well as further providers that the Intelligence Unit investigated in 2015 
and 2016, regardless of the issue investigated.
17 We undertook online research to identify recruitment practices in a 
risk‑based sample of 32 alternative providers in 2015 and 2016. We searched 
recruitment advertisements posted between January 2015 and December 2016, on the 
providers’ websites, as well as on Facebook and Twitter. The risk-based sample included 
the providers we identified in our 2014 report, as well as further providers investigated by 
the Intelligence Unit in 2015 and 2016, regardless of the issue investigated.
16 Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Investigation into financial support for 
students at alternative higher education providers, Session 2014-15, HC 861, National Audit Office, December 2014.
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Appendix Three
Summary of progress against previous recommendations
Figure 16
Update on the issues we found in 2014
What the Committee of Public 
Accounts recommended in 2015 
on the basis of our 2014 report
Update and action taken by the Department
The Department should report back 
to the Committee urgently with an 
assessment of how much public 
money is at risk of being wasted.
• The level of ineligible payments has fallen as a proportion of all payments made to 
alternative providers from 4% in 2012/13 to 0.5% in 2015/16 (paragraphs 2.2).
• The Department has not recovered £36 million of the £45 million ineligible payments made 
between 2010/11 and 2015/16 including £10 million in 2014/15 and 2015/16 (paragraph 2.6).
The Department must systematically 
assess and control the specific risks 
associated with widening access to 
learning identified by the National 
Audit Office and provide us with a 
clear explanation of how it will manage 
these risks in future.
• The number of students at alternative providers receiving support has declined from a 
peak of 51,000 in 2013/14 to 34,000 in 2015/16. The total support paid to students has 
declined from £724 million in 2013/14 to £417 million in 2015/16 (paragraph 2.9).
• The Department has strengthened its oversight arrangements, increased engagement 
with providers and investigative capacity, and taken action where it has concerns 
(paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5; Figure 9).
• The Department has introduced new requirements and checks. In particular, it introduced 
new minimum requirements on students’ English-language proficiency and 19 of the 
21 providers we checked are compliant (paragraph 2.23). The Department also introduced 
checks on students’ registration with the awarding body Edexcel (paragraphs 2.25 and 2.26).
The Department needs to ensure that 
it has a much firmer grip on the quality 
of teaching in private sector higher 
education colleges. It needs to identify 
poor performers and take appropriate 
action to protect students and the 
sector as a whole.
• The Department has made changes to the quality review framework for alternative 
providers (paragraphs 2.27 to 2.29).
• Non-continuation rates for students at alternative providers have reduced from 38% in 
2012/13 to 25% in 2014/15 but remain higher than the benchmark for the sector (22%), 
which corrects for differences in some student characteristics (paragraph 2.12).
• The Department has taken action against all 11 providers with high non-continuation 
rates in 2014/15 (Figure 6).
The Department needs to set specific, 
measurable objectives for its policy 
[of expanding the alternative provider 
sector], and collect and analyse the 
right data in order to evaluate the 
full impact, taking account of any 
unanticipated impacts, such as the 
recruitment of EU students.
• Although data are only available for two academic years, there are signs that expanding 
the alternative provider sector is widening access to under-represented groups including 
older and more ethnically diverse students (paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5).
• The July 2017 edition of the Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) 
survey included for the first time information about employability and salaries for 
undergraduate students who graduated from alternative providers in 2015/16 
(paragraph 4.9).
Notes
1 Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Investigation into fi nancial support for students
at alternative higher education providers, Session 2014-15, HC 861, National Audit Offi ce, December 2014.
2 Non-continuation rates measure the proportion of students who did not return for their following academic year.
3 Benchmark non-continuation rate is the average non-continuation rate after accounting for differences in students’ characteristics 
including age and subjects studied.
Source: National Audit Offi ce
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